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Self-Knowledge and the First-Person
1
It is a familiar view in the philosophy of mind and action is that for a thought or
attitude to constitute a reason for an action is for it to render intelligible, in the light of
norms of rationality or reason, that action.  However, I can make sense of your actions in
this way by crediting you with attitudes that I myself do not hold.  Equally, you can do this
for my actions.  So not all reasons for one’s actions are one’s own reasons.  What more is
involved in a reason’s being one’s own reason for acting?
2
Two key elements seem to be crucial.  First, the rational intelligibility of the action
must be from the agent’s point of view.  The agent must herself be capable of viewing that
thought or attitude as a reason for her to act.  Second, and relatedly, the agent must be
motivated by that reason to act in accordance with it.
3  In what follows, I want to explore the
role that the first element plays in a thought’s or attitude’s being one’s own reason for
acting.   Specifically, I want to get clearer on what it is for an agent to have her own point of
view on her thoughts and other attitudes in such a way as to provide her with her own
reasons for acting.  In order to do this, I need to focus on another, closely related question:
what is it for one to know one’s thoughts and attitudes as one’s own?
                                                
1 This paper was read at a conference in Utrecht on Reasons of One’s Own, in May 2001.  I am indebted to
the participants of the conference and to the other contributors for very helpful discussion and comments,
and in particular to Jonathan Dancy and Graham Macdonald.  I am also indebted to Tyler Burge for extended
comments on the paper, which, in many cases, but I am sure not all, I have addressed.  I thank Maureen
Sie, Marc Slors, and Bert van den Brink for their patience in allowing me time to complete the paper for
publication.
2 One obvious response to the question is: one’s own reasons are those that causally influence one’s
actions.  Why isn’t this sufficient?  Burge’s view, with which I agree, is that one’s own reasons play a
special epistemic role in justifying, evaluating, criticizing and adjusting one’s attitudes as well as the
actions effected by them.
3 For the purposes of this paper, I am taking reasons to be internal reasons in the sense articulated by
Bernard Williams (see “Internal and External Reasons”, in Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University
press, 1981), where an internal reason is an element in her “subjective motivational set” (p. 102) which
“can contain such things as dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction, personal loyalties,
and various projects, as they may be abstractly called, embodying commitments of the agent.” (p. 105).2
I want to try to motivate the view that an adequate answer to this question requires
some kind of ‘bottom-up’ internalist epistemology of self-knowledge; one that derives the
epistemic warrant or justification for self-knowledge from considerations that are located in
the mental states of subjects that lead them to form their second-order beliefs (namely, the
contents of prior beliefs and experiences).
4  I will attempt this by considering one very
powerful and highly influential argument for an answer to the question that assigns no role
to such an epistemology, recently developed in a number of works by Tyler Burge.
5  I will
                                                
4 Second-order beliefs can be characterised as beliefs that [I X that p], for some attitude X and some
propositional content p, and where p is first-order (p’s being first-order can then be defined in terms of the
absence of epistemic operators). I have explained in the text what I mean by a ‘bottom-up’ epistemology.
It contrasts with the kind of epistemology that is the focus of Burge’s accounts of epistemic entitlement,
which is ‘top-down’.  A ‘top-down’ epistemology, at least as Burge envisages it, is one that locates the
source of epistemic warrant for such knowledge in the role that it plays in constituting the rational agent.
(Future references to these positions will drop the scare quotes.)  Although my commitment here is to an
internalist bottom-up epistemology of self-knowledge, the distinction between a top-down and a bottom-up
epistemology of self-knowledge is not in general the same as that between an externalist and an internalist
one.  One might give an explanation of the source of the justification or warrant for self-knowledge in
terms that are not generally available to subjects, say, for example, in terms that refer to the mechanisms
that reliably causally generate their first-order beliefs, and the mechanisms responsible for reliably causally
generating second-order beliefs from first-order ones.  Such an explanation might be both bottom-up in
locating the source of warrant for self-knowledge in the factors concerning the reliability of the mechanisms
causally responsible for generating second-order states from first-order ones and epistemically externalist.
Again, Burge’s account of the source of justification in particular cases of self-knowledge involving what he
calls the cogito-type cases (ones in which one is thinking currently consciously thinking about a thought
with a given propositional content while thinking that very thought and where the latter constitutes the
subject matter of the former) is epistemically internalist but not bottom up (since the first-order thought
literally forms part of the second-order thought about it.   Burge (“Reason and the First-Person”, in C.
Wright, B. Smith, and C. Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds.  Oxford: Oxford University press,
1998, pp. 243-70) thinks that the reliability of psychological mechanisms is relevant to the question of our
warrant to self-knowledge, but is not the source of that warrant.  So, although his account of our epistemic
warrant or entitlement to self-knowledge is in a certain sense externalist, it is ‘top-down’ rather than
‘bottom-up’.  When a person forms a belief, through the exercise of one of her basic epistemic faculties
(perception, memory, testimony), she is prima facie entitled to that belief.  The reason is that, from an
informed external point of view, she has acquired her belief by exercising a reliable faculty, one whose
employment enables her to acquire true beliefs about facts that she would otherwise be unable to acquire.
The difference between Burge and other epistemic externalists is that, for him, the epistemic faculties that
we are inclined to trust from the first-person point of view are ones that we are entitled to trust because they
constitute us as rational agents.  It is this that is the source of our entitlement to self-knowledge, and makes
his account a ‘top-down’ one, in contrast to a ‘bottom-up’ one such as Christopher Peacocke’s (see his
“Entitlement, Self-Knowledge and Conceptual Redeployment”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96
(1996), pp. 117-58).
5 See his “Content Preservation”, Philosophical Review102 (1993) pp 457-88, “Our Entitlement to Self-
Knowledge”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 96 (1996) pp. 91-116, and “Reason and the First
Person”, in Knowing Our Own Minds, op. cit.3
argue that Burge’s own answer is incomplete – and incomplete in a way that makes space
for, and helps to motivate, a ‘bottom-up’ internalist epistemology.
Having done this, I will turn to the question of what it is for an agent to know her
reasons as her own, a question that Burge does not explicitly consider, and argue that an
account of what it is to know one’s reasons as one’s own requires, but is not exhausted, by
an account of what it is to know one’s thought contents and attitudes as one’s own.   What
more is required is an account of what is involved in being sensitive to, or feeling the ‘pull’
of, reasons that is so important to their motivational status.  Burge’s own treatment of
knowing one’s thoughts and other attitudes as one’s own appeals to a notion of ‘intellectual
experience’ (by which he means: intellectual understanding of instantiations of intentional
contents along with their ‘I’ components).  But this appeal actually encourages a ‘bottom-
up’ internalist epistemology of knowledge of one’s own reasons.  The issue up for
discussion here is not whether an epistemology of self-knowledge is needed at all.  It is
whether a top-down internalist epistemology of the sort that Burge advances suffices for an
account of rational motivation.  I shall argue that it does not.
In section 1 below, I briefly outline the structure of Burge’s arguments for (a) our
entitlement to self-knowledge of thought contents and attitudes, and (b) our entitlement to
knowledge of them as our own.  I then identify some important features of these arguments
that will figure in subsequent sections of the paper.  Section 2 develops the argument for a
‘bottom-up’ internalist epistemology of self-knowledge of thought contents and attitudes as
ones own, in which the first-person perspective plays a central role.  Section 3 argues that an
account of the motivational status of reasons essential to rational thought and action
encourages an epistemology of this kind.
Section 1.
We think that certain sorts of thoughts or judgements involved in self-knowledge
are epistemically special.  They are special at least in that they are epistemically immediate,4
not based on inferences from anything else. When I think: it’s raining outside, and head for
my umbrella, I know that I am thinking that it’s raining in this immediate kind of way.
This feature of epistemic immediacy characterises the so-called cogito-like cases; ones in
which subjects are currently consciously thinking about a thought with a given propositional
content while thinking that thought.   However, most judgements involved in self-knowledge
are non-inferential in the sense that we typically have no justifying argument or evidence
backing them up.  I typically know, and am in a position to judge, what I believe, and that I
believe it, without appealing to argument or evidence.  According to Burge, the immediate
relation that holds between thinkers and certain of their own thoughts not only characterises
cases in which one is currently consciously thinking a thought and reflecting on it (the so-
called cogito-like cases), but characterises most thoughts or judgements involved in self-
knowledge.
It is tempting to think that the source of this epistemic immediacy lies in some kind
of special relation that thinkers bear to their own thoughts when they are reflecting on them,
based on some sort of ‘inner observation’, which others do not and cannot share.
Knowledge of others, it might be thought, is based on inferences from observations of their
behaviour, and so is not immediate.  But in one’s own case, there is no need for inferences
of this (or any other) kind.  One can simply perceive one’s own thoughts while thinking
them, ‘run through’ them in one’s head.
One reason why we might be tempted to think in this way is that we have a deep
intuition that subjects are at least sometimes authoritative with regard to knowledge of
certain of their own thoughts. 
6 We think that this makes for an asymmetry between self-
knowledge and knowledge of others, where there is no presumption of authority.  Further,
we think that the privileged position subjects occupy with regard to knowledge of their own
                                                
6 Of course, this is not the only one, since one needn’t suppose agents are authoritative in order to
appreciate the asymmetry.  The asymmetry is apparent just from the mode of access: irrespective of whether
I am right or wrong about what believe, for instance, I acquire my beliefs about my beliefs on some basis
that is necessarily different from the basis on which you5
thoughts is no mere courtesy of interpretation by others.
7  We think that there is a genuine
epistemic difference between self-knowledge and knowledge of others, one that grounds the
presumed asymmetry.  Appealing to the idea that introspection provides subjects with
privileged access to certain of their own thought contents and attitudes is a natural way of
attempting to explain the special epistemic position subjects enjoy with regard to certain of
their own thoughts.   And introspection is naturally viewed as a kind of ‘inner observation’.
However, Burge maintains that this way of thinking is fundamentally mistaken.  His
claim is that the source of the special epistemic status of thoughts or judgements
constituting self-knowledge lies in ordinary reason, and not in any mechanism relating a
thinker to an observed or sensed object (and so not in any perceptual or quasi-perceptual
relation). Perceptual experiences may, and probably do, figure in the acquisition of most
contents, and so in the acquisition of thoughts containing them.  But it doesn’t follow that
such experiences figure in the epistemic warrant subjects have for knowledge of their
thought contents. This distinction between acquisition and warrant is crucial to Burge’s
position.
His key idea is that our warrant or entitlement to self-knowledge is broader than
justification in that it does not consist in reasons or evidence that we need bring explicitly to
bear on our beliefs and judgements. The entitlement consists simply in functioning in an
appropriate way in accordance with norms of rationality or reason, and it has two sources.
One is the special role that such knowledge plays in critical reason and reasoning.  The
other is the special (“constitutive”) relation between judgements involving self-knowledge
                                                
7 For interpretationist accounts, see, for example, Donald Davidson, "First Person Authority", Dialectica 38
(1984), pp. 101-111, and "Knowing One's Own Mind".  Proceedings and Addresses of the American
Philosophical Association 60 (1987), pp. 441-58; Daniel Dennett, The Intentional Stance (Massachusetts:
MIT Press, 1987); and Richard Moran, "Interpretation Theory and the First Person", The Philosophical
Quarterly 44 (1994), pp. 154-173, “Self-Knowledge: Discovery, Resolution, and Undoing”, European
Journal of Philosophy 5 (1997), pp. 141-61, and Authority and Estrangement  (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton
University Press, 2001).6
and their subject matter, or truth, or between one’s judgements about one’s thoughts and
those judgements’ being true.  Here, in brief outline, is the argument.
8
Critical reasoning involves critically assessing, evaluating, adjusting and correcting
one’s putative reasons as reasons, rather than merely as thought contents.   It involves the
ability to employ reason and reasoning to assess and criticise the reasonableness of
reasoning itself. So critical reasoning is reasoning that is under the rational control of the
reasoner.
9
One cannot bring under one’s rational control something of which one is unaware.
In order for reasons to be under the rational control of the reasoner, then, she must normally
be knowledgeable about her thoughts.   She must know the contents, but also the attitudes,
since critical reasoning is not just concerned with evaluating propositional connections, but
also concerned with confirming, adjusting, and correcting attitudes.
So control over one’s reasoning requires knowledge of one’s attitudes and contents.
But it also requires that the relation between one’s judgements or thoughts about one’s
thoughts and those judgements’ /thoughts’ being true be constitutive: it cannot be one that
could fail to hold.  If it could, then reflection could add nothing to the reasonableness of
critical reasoning.  But reflection does add something to this process.  Crucially, it brings
one’s attitudes under the rational control of the thinker.
10 This constitutive, or non-
contingent, relation between the subject matter and the truth of one’s judgements /thoughts
about one’s thoughts is the second source of subjects’ entitlement to self-knowledge.
11
                                                
8 See “Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge”.
9 Because exercises of rationality require voluntary control, it might be thought that, in general, rationality
does not apply to beliefs or desires per se, but rather to such voluntary attitudes as accepting and rejecting.
This point connects with remarks in section about the motivational force of reasons requiring not just
knowledge, but also endorsement of, one’s thought contents and attitudes.
10 “Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge”, p. 101.
11 One might ask here: why, other than to purchase an easy victory over scepticism?  Further, one might
ask whether this talk of one’s judgements being constitutive of their truth leads to a radical relativism and
failure of objectivity.  Won’t the follower of counter-induction or the inveterate affirmer of the consequent
be able to judge that those inferential processes are rational and so render it true that they are rational?  After
all, the irrational can reflect on their processes, judge them rational, indeed ‘prove’ them rational using
those very methods, e.g., produce unsound soundness proofs for unsound systems (thanks to Alan Weir for
discussion on this). Perhaps Burge’s claim about the constitutive relation between judgements about one’s7
One might wonder how, if judgements/thoughts about one’s thoughts are
constitutively related to their subject matter, one could ever be mistaken about one’s
judgements about one’s first-order attitudes and contents.   Certainly, in the case of the
cogito-type thoughts, where one is currently consciously thinking about one’s thought
while thinking that very thought, and where that thought s forms the subject matter of one’s
current conscious thinking, one cannot be mistaken.  Self-knowledge in these cases is
infallible.   However, in cases of standing beliefs, whose contents (along with their
‘I’components) are not instantiated in current conscious thinking, one can be mistaken, and
in these cases such knowledge as is constituted by one’s thoughts about such beliefs is
defeasible by evidence.  In the former sort of case there is both knowledge and first-person
authority, in the latter case, there may be self-knowledge, but there is no first-person
authority.  Moreover, in these latter sorts of cases, the supplementary entitlement needed will
go beyond the entitlement that is grounded in critical reasoning.  It will involve reference to
some underlying mechanism responsible for generating second-order states from first-order
ones, and there will be a question of how or whether that mechanism is reliable, and so will
involve empirical elements.
It seems that, for Burge, critical reasoning involves cogito-type states.   In critical
reasoning, one subjects one’s own thoughts and other attitudes to critical evaluation,
assessment, and adjustment, and does so by currently consciously thinking those
thoughts/attitudes while thinking about them.   Thus, there is an intimate connection between
being a critical reasoner, and thinking thoughts about one’s own thoughts where the relation
between those thoughts and their subject matter is constitutive - the two sources of our
entitlement to self-knowledge.  In order to be a critical reasoner, one must employ thoughts
of this kind, and these thoughts necessarily constitute knowledge.
                                                                                                                                                
thoughts and their subject matter or truth is only intended to apply to the cogito-type cases, and not to
judgements about one’s inferential processes.  But this seems wrong, given his view that in particular cases
one can know with absolute certainty that one is reasoning correctly.  These issues are taken up in section 3
below.8
However, cogito-type thoughts or judgements comprise only a small class of states
that constitute self-knowledge.   Many thoughts, such as thoughts about one’s standing
beliefs, are such that the relation between them and their subject matter is not constitutive.
In these cases the entitlement that comes from being a critical reasoner will not suffice to
guarantee self-knowledge.
Burge argues that, in critical reasoning, self-knowledge must take a distinctive, non-
observational (non-empirical) form.  The reason has to do with the constitutive connection
between one’s judgements about one’s thoughts and those judgements’ being true (i.e., the
constitutive connection between such judgements and their subject matter).  If all of one’s
self-knowledge were observational, the connection between reflection and thought reflected
upon would rest on a ‘brute (or ‘unreasoning’) contingency’ (a merely causal connection).
Systematic error would be possible.  But this is incompatible with the role that critical
reasoning plays in guiding one’s evaluations, adjustments, and corrections of reasons.  That
role requires that a single point of view be involved in critical reasoning, so that such
reasoning is capable of giving the reviewer reason, from the point of view of the review, to
adjust or correct the thought reviewed.  If all of self-knowledge were like observation, agents
would have an estranged perspective on their first-order thoughts; they wouldn’t take facts
about their first-order states to be directly relevant to their self-control and governance in
immediately moving them to act.  And if this were to happen, the rational connection
between self-ascriptions and first-order thoughts wouldn’t hold – the former would not give
the agent direct reasons to change the latter.
12  In short, our second-order or reflective
beliefs and judgements about the nature and contents of attitudes in the first-person case are
warranted simply because of our nature as critical reasoners.  Because of this nature, we are
apriori entitled to knowledge of the form, that attitude is the thought (belief, desire, etc.)
that p, where p is some propositional content.
                                                
12 “The attitudes reviewed would be to the reviews as physical objects are to our observational judgements.
They would be purely ‘objects’ of one’s inquiry, not part of the perspective of the inquiry.” “Our
Entitlement to Self Knowledge”, p. 110.9
Burge extends this argument to include our entitlement to what he calls the first-
person concept - our entitlement to knowledge of our thoughts and judgements as our own.
His argument has the consequence that we are apriori entitled to add to knowledge of the
form, that attitude is the thought that p knowledge of the form and that attitude is mine.
13
As in the case of knowledge of one’s contents and attitudes, the warrant or entitlement that
one has for knowing one’s thoughts as one’s own is not based on a perceptual or quasi-
perceptual acquaintance either with a self, or with one’s own thoughts.
According to the argument, to fully understand the notion of a reason, to fully
appreciate a reason as a reason, requires possession of the first-person concept.  This
concept has a very special function: it marks the fact that certain contents and attitudes are
directly relevant to producing beliefs and actions; that they immediately move one to
implement them.  Without that concept, one cannot appreciate the distinction between
reasons that are one’s own and reasons that belong to others.  And without that
appreciation, one cannot be moved by reasons and reasoning, and understand (i.e.,
conceptualise) what it is to be moved in this kind of way. 
14 But full understanding of the
concept of a reason requires appreciation not just of its role in rational evaluation, but also
of its motivational force.  And, according to Burge, one cannot appreciate the latter without
appreciating the force of reasons in one’s own case, and conceptualising it.  In order to do
that, one must actually be moved by reasons, and one must have the first-person concept.
Just as being a competent critical reasoner implies knowing one’s contents and
attitudes, being competent with the ‘I’ concept implies knowing one’s attitudes and contents
as one’s own.  So the argument for our entitlement to knowledge of our reasons as our own
goes like this:
                                                
13 See “Reason and the First-Person”.  I owe this way of putting the point to Laura Schroeter.
14 It seems obvious that if I lack the first-person concept I can’t appreciate the distinction between my
reasons and those of others.  But it is not obvious that without that concept I also could not be moved by
reasons.  Very young children, highly autistic children, higher animals can all be motivated by desires, for
example, though they might lack the first person concept.  But Burge can concede this: his idea is that they
could not be rationally motivated, since they are not fully critical reasoners.10
1. Reasoning is necessarily governed by evaluative norms that provide
standards of good and bad reasoning.
2. In order to fully understand reasons and reasoning (or the concept of
reason), it is not enough to understand in the abstract the concepts of good
reason and bad reason.  This is because reasons not only evaluate but also
have force; they move one to act.
3. Also, in order to fully understand reasons and reasoning, it is not enough to
understand that they have force.  One must understand this in one’s own
case.   And again, not simply in the abstract: one must actually employ
reasons in affecting judgements and other actions, and to understand this.
4.  One cannot apply reasons in one’s own case and understand this application
without the first-person concept.  For, if one understands this fully, one
recognises oneself as an agent.
A crucial move in the argument is made in premise 3, where it is claimed that full
understanding of the notion of a reason and reasoning requires actually employing reasons
and reasoning in thought and action.   It seems right to say that without the first-person
concept, one cannot appreciate the distinction between reasons that are one’s own and
reasons that belong to others.  But why, in order to fully understand the notion of a reason
and reasoning, must be ‘immediately moved’ to implement them  - why isn’t it sufficient
that one understand in the abstract that reasons have force in one’s own case?
15  And what
is involved in being ‘immediately moved’ to implement one’s reasons?  It cannot be that
one is immediately moved to act – it must be that one feels the force of such reasons’
impact on one’s attitudes and contents.
                                                
15 It is also unclear why one needs the first-person concept to be able to do this.  Suppose that I exist in a
solipsistic world.  In that case I might have no need for a concept whose function is to mark out certain
thought contents and attitudes as mine.  But I might nevertheless be capable of implementing, and being
immediately moved by, my thought contents and attitudes.11
Evidently, it isn’t sufficient to understand in the abstract that reasons have force in
one’s own case because one cannot fully understand the motivational force of reasons, and
so the notion of a reason itself, unless one actually feels their force:
Understanding what a reason is, is partly understanding its motive force, as well as
its evaluative norms.  To understand reason and reasoning, this force must be
operative in one’s own case; and one must conceptualise its implementation.
16
The point here is not merely one about what is required for a subject to be moved by
reasons, since infants and higher animals might be moved by, e.g., desires.  It is one about
what is required for a subject to be rationally moved by reasons.  One can’t be rationally
moved without understanding the motivating force of reasons.  And one can’t really
appreciate this force without being able to distinguish one’s own point of view from the
point of view of others.  There are two reasons for this.  The first concerns the system-
dependence of having reasons.  A reason may motivate me, but not another, to act because
my background beliefs and other knowledge differs from that other.  So I can’t really feel
the motivational pull of reasons in my own case unless I can distinguish my background
beliefs and knowledge from those of another.  The second concerns the fact that I can only
affect another’s attitude by force or persuasion, indirectly, by means of other practical
premises.  But this is not so in my own case.  So, in order to feel the motivational force of
reasons, I need to be able to tell which ones are mine.
These two features mark the immediacy of reasons in one’s own case, and so mark
the distinction between one’s own point of view and the point of view of another.  Why
must reasons at least sometimes move one immediately (i.e., without inference) to
implement them in thought or action?  They must on pain of regress.  In actual reasoning,
one cannot always require a further premise or reason for implementing a reason, or one
could never implement a reason.  But the implementational aspect of a reason is essential to
its being a reason.
                                                
16 “Reason and the First-Person”, p. 251.12
Burge claims that the distinction between cases where in reasoning and evaluating
attitudes or acts under rational norms one is immediately motivated to implement them and
cases where this is not so is knowable a priori:
We can also know apriori how to conceptualise and recognise instances where
implementation is immediately incumbent, and understand wherein these instances
are relevantly different from cases where an evaluation of attitudes does not
rationally demand immediate implementation of the evaluation on the attitudes being
evaluated.
Such knowledge is apriori in that its warrant or justification is apriori: it derives from
understanding or some other cognitive process, rather than from sense experiences or
perceptual beliefs.
17
What is the relation between the motivational aspect crucial to knowing one’s
reasons as one’s own, and the first-person perspective crucial to knowing one’s reasons as
one’s own?  It seems that, for Burge, the motivational aspect depends on and derives from
the first-person perspective.  Being immediately moved by reasons requires knowing how to
distinguish cases where reasons are one’s own and cases where they are not. Recognising
and marking ownership of ones thought contents and attitudes as one’s own constitutes the
basis of such motivation.
Section 2
Burge’s arguments for our entitlement to knowledge of our thought contents and
attitudes and our entitlement to knowledge of our thoughts and attitudes as our own have
                                                
17 Thus, he says, “A justification or entitlement is apriori if its justificational force is in no way constituted
or enhanced by reference to or reliance on the specifics of some range of sense experiences or perceptual
beliefs.” (“Content Preservation”, p. 458)  The difference between justification and warrant or entitlement is
that, in the former case, the force consists in reasons that a subject can explicitly bring to bear on the
practice or belief.  In the latter case, the warrant may not even be accessible to the subject.  Burge claims
that one can in this way know apriori of the existence of certain particulars, specifically mental ones:  “This
conception of apriority allows that one can know apriori of the existence of particulars – for example,
particular mental events – if one’s justification or entitlement is intellectual, not sense-perceptual.  For13
the same form.  Both depend on the claim that it is in our nature to be critical reasoners.
The claim is that we could not reason critically if we did not normally know our thought
contents and attitudes and if we did not fully understand the notion of reason and reasoning
in our own case.  Burge takes these arguments to show that we have an apriori, but
defeasible, warrant to self-knowledge and to the first-person concept.
18 And its epistemic
status as a warrant consists in the fact that it plays an essential role in critical reasoning, and
being a rational agent.
There might seem to be something missing in this account of how one knows one’s
thought contents and attitudes, and knows them as one’s own.  If what one is looking for is
an explanation of the sub-personal mechanism or causal process by which we acquire or
arrive at justified self-attributions of the form: I think p, Burge hasn’t provided one.  But
then he makes it quite clear that this is not the issue he is interested in:
Let me emphasise that the issues here have to do with the nature of the epistemic
warrant, not the mechanism that makes the knowledge possible.  Of course, we need
perception to hear or see words.  So we need perception to understand speech
emanating from another mind.  That is how we do it.  This is a difference between
knowledge of other minds and knowledge of one’s own.  For one normally does
not need perception to know one’s own thoughts.  But these points concern the
mechanism of knowledge acquisition, not in my view, the nature of our epistemic
warrant – justification or entitlement.
19
The claim here is that the psychological causal mechanism responsible for generating
knowledge of one’s own attitudes is not part of what warrants self-attributions.
20 Warrant is
                                                                                                                                                
example, I think that one knows apriori, in this sense, cogito-like thoughts.” (“Reason and the First-
Person”, p. 264)
18 See “Reason and the First-Person”, p. 264, n.14, and “Content Preservation”.  Also, see “Our
Entitlement to Self-Knowledge”, p. 104, n. 8: “There is no recipe for ensuring that our judgements are
immediate or that they are about the relevant class.  There is no internal recipe for avoiding error.”
19 “Reason and the First-Person”, p. 264. Also, p. 246.
20  However, Burge’s point that the way in which we acquire knowledge of our own thoughts and
knowledge of the thoughts of others concerns “how we do it” does not and is not intended to show that it is
not of epistemic importance.  Consider, by way of analogy, perceptual knowledge.  The way in which we14
effected by the role that self-knowledge and the first-person concept play in explaining our
nature as critical thinkers, specifically, the role that beliefs about one’s attitudes play in
accounting for that nature.  Burge locates the issue of the acquisition of self-knowledge in
the account of the psychological mechanism that generates such beliefs.  He is not
interested in the details of that mechanism.   For, in the cogito-type cases at least, where
one’s first-order thought is literally a constituent of one’s second-order thought about it,
there is no such mechanism.   And, in other cases of self-knowledge, such as knowledge of
one’s standing beliefs, although there is such a mechanism, its details and reliability form
no part of the entitlement that springs from being a critical reasoner, but are due to a
supplementary warrant.   Even in this case, though, knowledge of the reliability of the
mechanism is not a condition on self-knowledge.   Its reliability is to be determined by
whether it issues in appropriate  - rational - thought and behaviour, from an informed
external point of view.
21
How, then, do we know that we are good reasoners - that our psychological
mechanisms are reliable and that we can trust them to lead us to think and act in accordance
with the norms of reason?  It might seem that Burge is claiming that we can tell that we are
good reasoners on the basis of evidence from what we actually think and do.  But this is
implausible given his view that our warrant to self-knowledge and the I concept is apriori.
                                                                                                                                                
acquire knowledge of objects in the mind-independent world can and often does make a difference to the
status of such knowledge.  Testimonial knowledge is in general epistemically less secure than knowledge of
what is visually present before one.  Knowledge acquired by inference is less secure than knowledge that is
not based on inference.  That some perceptual knowledge is less secure than other such knowledge does not
by itself threaten its status as knowledge.  But it can, and often does, threaten its status as privileged.
Similarly, how we acquire self-knowledge and how we acquire knowledge of others may, and I think does,
make a difference to the epistemic status of such knowledge.
21 Thus, for example, he says,
“I am inclined to think that it is a conceptual necessity that there be causal relations in perception.  But for
purposes of my argument, the fundamental feature is that the entitlement to observational beliefs
necessarily rests on some pattern of brute, contingent, non-rational relations between observed and observer,
regardless of whether the contingent relations are causal.  It is common to my view and the opposed
observational view of self-knowledge that in many of the cases under dispute, there is a causal mechanism
that relates attitudes to judgements about them.  What is in dispute is the nature of the epistemic
entitlement that one has to such judgements, not the existence of a psychological mechanism.  On the
simple observational model, our entitlement to self-knowledge always rests partly on the brute, contingent,
non-rational causal relations.”  (“Our Entitlement to Self-Knowledge”, p. 106, n. 12)15
Nor does it seem right to say that we know apriori that we are good reasoners – by knowing
that the concept of a good reason just is the concept of what we are inclined, on reflection, to
be motivated by to think or do.  For our inclinations can lead us astray, and our warrant is
defeasible in particular cases.  In any case, it threatens to rob the notion of reason of its
objectivity by making it too agent-relative, something that Burge would not want to allow.
For the follower of counter-induction, or the inveterate affirmer of the consequent might be
able to judge that those inferential processes are rational and so render it true that they are
rational, if these judgments are part of the process of critical reasoning.
It seems that Burge’s view is that we cannot prove to ourselves that we are good
reasoners, but we can do more than just actively commit ourselves to a policy of being
sensitive to reasons and reasoning with a certain amount of optimism that it will issue in
success.
22  In critical reasoning, we understand our own reasoning, and this alone gives us
justification for our standing as critical reasoners.  We can know in particular cases, by
engaging in such reasoning, that we are reasoning well.
Fundamental to this position is a sharp distinction between the psychological
mechanism that generates second-order attitudes from first-order ones, on the one hand, and
entitlements to one’s self-ascriptions, on the other.  But one could agree that there is some
such distinction and still think that there is a question of justification that isn’t being
addressed.  Burge’s account of our warrant to self-knowledge and to the first-person
concept tells us what role self-knowledge and the I concept play in constituting a rational
agent. This can be viewed as an attempt to defeat a kind of global scepticism about self-
knowledge.  But it cannot help defeat doubts that arise in particular cases about whether one
can trust one’s belief-forming mechanisms to lead to correct second-order attitudes, and to
lead one to think and act in accordance with the norms of rationality.  Burge may give us a
sound epistemic policy to follow, but it is difficult to see how this can help reassure us in
                                                
22 Thus, he says, “… understanding reason entails some optimism and commitment regarding the
possibility and effect of reason in one’s thinking”. (“Reason and the First-Person”, p. 257).  I am indebted
to Laura Schroeter here.16
particular cases, cases where doubts can and do arise about whether one is reasoning
correctly.  The account has the consequence that one cannot support one’s self-ascriptions
through explicit reasoning.
The ability to reassure oneself in particular cases and the exercise of it matters
because this is where one’s epistemic responsibility for one’s second-order thoughts gets a
hold and impacts on one’s other attitudes and actions. It is reassurance in the particular
cases that supports the general view that one is right to rely on one’s reasoning to produce
beliefs and other attitudes that conform to the norms of rationality and reason.  That one is
right is a fundamental part of Burge’s view that subjects are epistemicially responsible for
their second-order attitudes.   But the sense that one is right is essential to one’s taking on
responsibility in particular cases of critical reasoning and action.  Further, the motivational
aspect of reasons depends on subjects’ appreciation of this epistemic responsibility in
particular cases.
23  So reassurance in the particular cases matters not only to the sense that
one is right to trust one’s psychological mechanisms, but to one’s being an epistemically
responsible agent and to one’s ability to be motivated to implement certain of one’s own
thoughts and other attitudes as reasons.
 Burge claims that we can know in particular cases that we are reasoning well just by
understanding our own reasoning that we are critical reasoners.   But cases like those
mentioned above – of the follower of counter-induction, and the inveterate affirmer of the
consequent - are ones where critical reasoning is taking place, but whose subjects are under
an illusion in thinking, judging, that they are reasoning well.  These subjects are not non-
rational; they are not failing to exercise reason, nor are they incapable of reflecting on their
own first-order thoughts and reasoning processes.  So, there is a question here, not of
whether one can know in particular cases, but how one can know in such cases that one is
reasoning correctly and well.   The need for an answer to this question is one motivation for
                                                
23 In the normal case – since, in certain cases, e.g., ones of akrasia, one might be motivated by reasons one
thinks are not responsible, or fail to be motivated by reasons one thinks are responsible.17
a bottom-up, internalist epistemology; a source to which one can appeal for reassurance, in
cases of doubt, that one has indeed reasoned correctly.
Critical reasoning must involve thoughts that are cogito-like, but even if it involves
only thoughts of this kind, and even if these thoughts are infallible, this would not by itself
suffice to provide assurance in particular cases where doubt arises about whether one is
reasoning correctly or well, since this concerns the moves that a reasoner makes from one
thought to another.   And if critical reasoning involves thoughts of other kinds, thoughts
about one’s standing beliefs, for example, or about one’s thoughts at an earlier time, then
doubts of another kind can arise; doubts about whether one’s judgements about one’s own
intentional states are even true.  Here a different kind of worry about whether one has
reasoned correctly arises, since a causal process connecting two thoughts is involved.
Suppose that I am sitting in a library, and am trying to re-capture a train of thought
which seemed to me at the time to constitute a decisive argument against a particular
philosophical position.  I am doing so in order to re-consider whether the argument is after
all as decisive as I had earlier thought.    Not having written it down, I need first to try to
reconstruct it in thought.   At various stages in the reconstruction process, I doubt whether I
have recaptured the right thought.  I ask myself, did I think that p here in the argument, or
was it that I thought that q?  Here the entitlement that has its source in critical reasoning will
not help me.  Why?  Because even if the thoughts I am having right now are ones that I
know, and know infallibly because they are cogito-type thoughts, the knowledge question
that is pressing is whether these thoughts match the ones had earlier, and match them in the
right order.  And that question is left entirely open.  But there does seem to be a way that I
might try to decide the matter, and that is by working my way up from earlier thoughts that I
have already placed in the argument.   Here it looks as though I might be able to reassure
myself by coming to see, as it were, that it was the thought that p, and not the thought that q,
that came next in the argument, by engaging in a bottom up internalist process.18
But there is also another process going on in this situation to consider, since I am
not just trying to reconstruct a train of thought I went through earlier.  I am also trying to
decide whether that train of thought – which we can now suppose I have successfully re-
captured – really does constitute an argument that is as decisive as I thought it was.  I think
it through again.   I begin to doubt that it is decisive; in fact, I begin to doubt whether I have
reasoned correctly at all.  Will mere understanding of the thoughts I am having, and/or
going through this process of reasoning now, suffice here to reassure me that I am indeed
reasoning correctly?  No, and for the same reason that was given three paragraphs back: I
might be an inveterate affirmer of the consequent, or follower of counter-induction.    Even
supposing the process here to involve are cogito-type thoughts, I cannot reassure myself
just by knowing those thoughts in virtue of understanding them, and by reasoning.
It may be that nothing could provide the kind of reassurance that is sought after
when doubt arises in the second stage of reasoning envisaged in my example.  But the point
is not something could; it is that, despite what Burge says, mere understanding and
knowledge of one’s thoughts when reasoning in particular cases, and mere understanding
of one’s own reasoning, is not sufficient to dispel doubts that arise in particular cases about
whether one is reasoning correctly or well, even when those cases involve cogito-type
thoughts.
What about the kind of reassurance that is sought after when doubt arises in the first
stage of reasoning envisaged in the above example?  Here the problem is that the thoughts
involved in the process of re-constructing the original argument may or may not match the
ones had at an earlier time, since this depends, at least in part, on the accuracy of my
memory.  Here Burge would agree that the entitlement or warrant that comes from critical
reasoning is not sufficient to dispel doubts that arise at this stage of the reasoning process.
But this is just where there is a need for a bottom up epistemology of self-knowledge, and
where such an epistemology can do some real explanatory work.19
Burge’s account doesn’t actually conflict with a ‘bottom-up’ internalist one, since it
is possible for there to be more than one warrant or justification for an attitude, but he isn’t
interested in it.
 24  This is because what is at issue for him is combating global scepticism
with regard to self-knowledge, not accounting for how potential defeaters can come to be
defeated in particular cases where doubt arises.   As he says, in the cogito-type cases, there
can be no such defeaters.  But since there can and often are such potential defeaters in
particular cases other than the cogito-type ones, his is not the only issue at stake.
On Burge’s behalf we might ask: in the non-cogito-type cases, why can’t I account
for the fact that I am in a better position with respect to knowledge of my own thoughts than
others are, and that I need to be in that better position in terms of the facts that (1) the
mechanism that subserves self-attributions is more reliable than the mechanism that
subserves attributions to others, and (2) this mechanism is more important to my
functioning as a rational agent than the mechanism that subserves the interpretation of
others?  And why can’t I account for the fact that the first-person point of view plays a
genuine epistemic role in answering the question of how one knows one’s thoughts in a
way that others do not by saying: of course there is a mechanism that makes one sensitive to
the fact that some thoughts emanate from oneself rather than from other people.  Why isn’t
that enough to explain what it is for one to have one’s own point of view on one’s thoughts
and attitudes?
                                                
24 For a ‘bottom-up’, internalist accounts, see Sydney Shoemaker, his "On Knowing One's Own Mind",
Philosophical Perspectives 2: Epistemology.  (California: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1988),
"Qualia and Consciousness,  Mind 100 (1991) pp. 507-24, and "Self-Knowledge and Inner Sense",
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LIV (1994), pp. 249-314.  His view that although one
normally does not need to go through any explicit reasoning process to be warranted in knowing one’s own
thoughts, it is necessary to that warrant that one be able to go through such a process in a particular case.
See also Peacocke’s account of epistemic entitlement (in "Entitlement, Self-Knowledge and Conceptual
Redeployment", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 96 (1996), pp. 117-158) for a different account,
based on a causal but rational (because reason-based) relation between perceptual beliefs and perceptual
experiences with non-conceptual content.  Cynthia Macdonald’s "Externalism and First-Person Authority",
Synthese 104 (1995), pp. 99-122, and "Externalism and Authoritative Self-Knowledge, Knowing Our Own
Minds ", ed. C. Wright, B. Smith, and C. Macdonald  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 135-
54) provides another account.20
The answer here has to do, not with the difference between a top-down and a
bottom-up epistemology, but with the difference between an epistemically internalist
justification and an epistemically externalist one. The argument here is that, in order to
reassure oneself in particular cases, ones in which doubt does arise as to whether one knows
one’s own contents and attitudes, it is important that one be able to explicitly reason one’s
way from one’s first-order beliefs and other attitudes to one’s second-order ones.  This is
precisely because one’s entitlement to self-knowledge is defeasible in particular cases.  This
reassurance is critically important because the sense that one is right is what makes agents
epistemically responsible for their reasons and reasoning.
Section 3
In the last section I argued that Burge’s account does not explain how it is that
knowledge of one’s thoughts and other attitudes as one’s own makes one epistemically
responsibile for them.  Why do I emphasise the contents of the attitudes here, since Burge’s
focus is on our ownership of them?  The reason is that the special kind of awareness of the
contents of one’s attitudes that is marked by possession of the first-person concept (and
with it awareness of such contents as contents of attitudes that are one’s own) is essential to
the sense of control and responsibility that – by Burge’s own lights – is constitutive of a
reason.  One cannot have control over, and claim ownership of, thoughts whose contents
one does not know, and know as one’s own.
However, this knowledge is not sufficient by itself to explain what it is to know
one’s reasons as one’s own.  One needs to understand how one’s awareness of ones
attitudes as one’s own can confer control over them in such a way as to transform them into
rational motivators of action.  At the very least, awareness must be coupled with
endorsement.  When I endorse my thought contents and attitudes in self-avowals of the
form ‘I believe that p’, I commit myself to things standing a certain way.  I openly
acknowledge that, however else the world may be, it is not an open question for me whether21
p.
25  I do not endorse all of my thoughts and attitudes, even when I know them and know
them as my own.  On the contrary, many of the thoughts that I have are ones that I do not
endorse, although I am perfectly aware that they are my own.  Think, for example, of
fleeting thoughts, speculations, memories, daydreams, and beliefs when not currently
consciously entertained.
Mere knowledge of one’s thought contents and attitudes as one’s own, then, does
not thereby constitute endorsement of them.  To endorse one’s thought contents and
attitudes is at least to acknowledge epistemic responsibility for them.  In cases of
schizophrenia, for example, patients remark that they are undergoing thoughts that have
been ‘inserted’ in them, which they do not ‘own’.  These patients are plainly aware of their
thoughts and contents, and they in some sense do know that these thoughts are their own, in
that they are able to introspect them, and recognise them as thoughts that they are
undergoing. But they do not experience them as their own.  And because they do not, they
are not prepared to claim ownership over, and epistemic responsibility for, them.
26  In these
cases it seems right to say that there is indeed a dissociation between the point of view of the
reviewer and the point of view of the thought reviewed which leads to a failure of
endorsement of the thought.  But there is no lack of knowledge of the thought as one’s
own.
So, besides endorsement, a further requirement seems to be that one in some sense
‘experiences’ one’s own thought contents and attitudes as one’s own.  And in fact Burge’s
own explanation of how it is that one knows one’s reasons as one’s own seems to require
this further element.   He appeals to the notion of “intellectual experience” in accounting
for them.  Thus, when arguing that there is no asymmetry between one’s entitlement to self-
knowledge and one’s entitlement to knowledge of others, he says,
                                                
25 For more on this see Richard Moran, “Self-Knowledge” Discovery, Resolution, and Undoing”, Op. Cit.,
and Authority and Estrangement, Op. cit.
26 See, for example, Nicolas Georgieff and Marc Jeannerod, “Beyond consciousness of External Reality: A
“Who” System for Consciousness of Action and Self-Consciousness”, Consciousness and Cognition722
One’s entitlement to believe in other minds can depend for its justificational force
on intellectual understanding of instantiations of intentional content – intellectual
‘experience’ – rather than sense-perceptual experience.
27
Further, he takes this experience of the force, or ‘pull’, of reasons to be essential to self-
knowledge of them.
This notion of ‘intellectual experience’ is plainly critical to Burge’s appeal both to
the importance of the role of the first-person point of view in knowing one’s thought
contents and attitudes as one’s own and to the importance of the motivational aspect of
reasons in critical reasoning.   It encourages a kind of bottom-up internalist epistemology of
self-knowledge of thoughts and others attitudes as one’s own of the kind argued for at the
end of Section 2.
An epistemology of this kind – one that derives the epistemic warrant or justification
for self-knowledge from considerations that are located in the mental states of subjects that
lead them to form their second-order beliefs  (namely, the contents of prior beliefs and
experiences)  - need not be committed to there being some kind of epistemic intermediary,
such as a process of inference, between first-order and second-order states involved in self-
knowledge.  In other contexts, I have argued that the kind of epistemology needed is one
that focuses on the notion of direct epistemic access.
28  As Burge notes, there is a kind of
epistemic immediacy that is characteristic of many cases of self-knowledge, specifically
ones involved in critical reasoning.  There may be no need for an explanation of this in the
cogito-type cases, although I myself think that the fact that they are self-verifying does not
by itself explain their epistemic immediacy.  There does seem to be a need for an
explanation of this in other cases of self-knowledge, like the case described in Section 2
above.
                                                                                                                                                
(1998), pp. 465-77, and Daniel M. Wegner and Thalia Wheatley, “Apparent Mental Causation: Sources of
the Experience of Will”, American Psychologist 54 (1999), pp. 480-92.
27 “Reason and the First-Person”, p. 268.
28 See, for example, “Externalism and First-Person Authority”, and “Externalism and Authoritative Self-
Knowledge”, where the account is defended in detail.23
My suggestion is that the notion of direct epistemic access at stake in these cases of
self-knowledge can be best understood in terms that have a natural home in the
epistemology of perception, while acknowledging that self-knowledge is not perception, and
is in some fundamental ways quite unlike it.  My view is that there are certain features of
properties to which subjects have direct epistemic access that are both essential to them
being directly epistemically accessible and also to mark them off from other sorts of
properties to which subjects do not typically have direct epistemic access.  One is that such
properties are epistemically basic in that they are the fundamental and favoured means by
which knowledge of the objects that have them is obtained.  Another is that such properties
typically are as they appear to be to normal subjects in normal circumstances.  These two
features are applicable to properties that fall into the broad category of observable,
specifically, primary qualities such as being square, and secondary qualities such as being
red, of objects of perceptual experience.  But they are also applicable, I think, to contentful
intentional properties in cases of self-knowledge involved in conscious reasoning.  Here, in
brief, is the argument.
Consider properties other than contentful intentional ones, where the notion of direct
epistemic access is generally thought to apply.  I know that the table visually present before
me is brown, and that it is rectangular, and this knowledge is plausibly understood as being
direct (although not baseless).  One explanation of how I can know directly that the table is
an instance of this particular shape property, or an instance of this particular colour
property, is that the instance is presented to me as an instance of that property through my
sense of sight. I perceive the instance as an instance of that property, and so no evidence is
needed to come to know that it is an instance of that property.
This is not true of other properties.  Water, for example, is an instance of the
chemical structural property, H2O, but this instance is not manifested to me as an instance of
that property through one of my senses.  In short, certain properties seem to be ones to
which we have direct epistemic access because they are observable: whether objects are24
instances of them can be determined just by unaided observation of those objects.  This is
not to say that one can know which observable property is being manifested to oneself on
any one occasion just by being presented with an instance of it.  One must be capable of
recognising another instance of that property as of that property when presented with it on
another occasion, and this requires one to have mastery of the concept of the relevant
property.  This means that the notion of direct epistemic access is intentional: in order for
one to have such access to a colour property such as the property, brown, it is not sufficient
that one sees an instance of the property.  One must see it as an instance of that property.
Certain features of observable properties characterise their epistemic directness in a
way that marks them off from other properties.  One is that they are epistemically basic or
fundamental to knowledge of objects that instance them.   Another is that they are in general
as they appear to be when instances of them are presented to normal perceivers in normal
circumstances.
I think that these two features apply to intentional properties even in the cogito-type
cases of self-knowledge involved in current conscious reasoning.  Consider the first feature.
When one thinks of a first-order intentional state while undergoing it, from the point of view
of a second-order intentional state, one’s grasp of that first-order state is first and foremost
a grasp of it as a state of a certain contentful type.  Consider the second feature: that such
properties are in general as they appear to be to their subjects.  This feature also applies to
intentional properties in the cogito-type cases.  The reason is that the relation between them
and normal subjects is in an important respects like that between certain observable
properties, namely, secondary qualities, and normal perceivers in normal circumstances.
Given that contentful intentional properties are in general as they appear to be to
normal subjects in normal circumstances in the cogito-type cases, and given that subjects are
the only ones to whom their contentful types appear when they appear in the epistemically
direct way, it follows that, in these cases, one’s first-order state cannot but be of the
particular contentful type by which one grasps it.  It could only be an intentional state other25
than one of the type a subject takes it to be in virtue of that subject’s grasping a different
contentful property.  But in that case one would be thinking a different thought altogether.
This account also applies to cases of distinct thoughts and instantiations of thought
contents involved in critical reasoning, of the sort described in Section 2. When one thinks
of a first-order intentional state by employing a second-order state with a content that is
intended to target the – distinct - content of an earlier intentional state, one employs a
contentful type which is epistemically basic and is in general as it appears to normal
subjects in normal circumstances.  But the content of the earlier state that one aims to target
is also one to which one has direct epistemic access in just this sense.  So the intellectual
moves involved in re-capturing an earlier train of thought no more involve a process of
inference than do those involved in thinking cogito-type thoughts themselves.   One either
grasps the contents of the earlier states, or one does not.  If one does, it cannot be by
employing thoughts with different contents.   So if one does, one grasps the contents of the
earlier states with as much epistemic immediacy as one grasps the contents of the states one
employs  - cogito-type states  - to target them.
Conclusion
I have argued that a certain highly influential account of our knowledge of our
thoughts and attitudes as our own developed by Tyler Burge is inadequate because
incomplete.  Central to my argument is the claim that, in order to account for how potential
defeaters come to be defeated in particular cases where doubt can and does arrive, and to
account for the epistemic immediacy on which the motivational force of reasons depends,
some kind of bottom-up internalist epistemology is required.   I have given some idea of the
kind of epistemology I think would work, and how it might help to provide the kind of
reassurance that is so important to the motivational status of reasons and reasoning.26
Cynthia Macdonald
University of Canterbury27
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